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Abstract—Electricity theft and illegal connection by ground
surface conductors is a pervasive problem in South Africa. The
impact this phenomenon has is not only limited to revenue loss
and equipment damage, but more importantly it presents a life
hazard. Although the issues of non-technical losses have been
researched for decades, no universal solution has been presented
due to the complexity of the problem. This paper investigates
the application of zero-sequence current-based detection as a
mitigation strategy to deal with illegal connections by ground
surface conductors. Simulation and experimental results show the
validity of this technique as well as its dependence on seasonal
change of the soil resistivity.
Index Terms—Non-technical losses, electricity theft, illegal
connections, ground surface conductors, soil resistivity, zero-
sequence current.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity theft is a pervasive problem for supply author-
ities worldwide. Illicit actions contribute the largest form of
non-technical losses (NTL). These losses may be defined as
unnatural since they are neither caused by series impedance
nor by shunt admittance associated to power lines. They
are usually attributed to theft, meter tampering or errors,
administration inefficiencies, and non-payment of electricity
bills. PennEnergy [1], records that each year 96 billions US
dollar are lost worldwide due to NTL, and energy theft ranks
third among the most commonly stolen items in the world.
In the USA, NTL losses amount to 6 billions US dollar per
year. The World Bank reports that energy theft in Sub-Saharan
Africa is in the order of 50 % of the generated capacity, and
further highlights that NTL may be as high as 1.2 % of the
gross domestic product (GDP) of quite a few countries in the
globe [2]. Recent studies, reported in [3] and [4], suggest that
an emerging country such as India suffers approximately 16
billions US dollar per year in revenue loss as a result of NTL.
In South Africa, NTL contribute in the range of 8 to 12 billions
of Rands in revenue loss per year [5]. Eskom [6], reports
that revenue loss related to energy theft is actually closer to
20 billions of Rands per year. Furthermore, because of NTL,
power utilities are compelled to compensate for power losses
by generating more electricity in order to offset such losses,
and the aggregate economic effect is unavoidably passed down
to electricity payment compliant consumers (non-defaulters)
− which negatively impacts on the collective economy. NTL
could also be associated to unplanned power outages as a
result of phase imbalance introduced by illegal connection or
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unmetered supply [7], [8].
However, the consequences of electricity theft cannot be
restricted to revenue losses and quality of supply. In fact, it is
a huge problem in terms of the safety of people living in and
around communities where electricity theft is common prac-
tice. The global perspective on the safety of these dwellings
is further emphasised by the fact that, for instance, 50 people
are electrocuted per week in one region of Eastern Uganda
alone where electricity theft is attempted [9]. Electricity theft
is thus an aggravating factor for NTL in South Africa, and has
a variety of consequences beyond revenue loss and quality of
supply. Besides revenue losses and deterioration in the quality
of supply, safety and the risk to human life is often overlooked
and therefore not considered. In 2017, 50 fatal incidents and
150 injuries attributed to electricity theft by means of illegal
connections were reported [10].
In this work, zero-sequence current (ZSC) measurement in
the star point node of a distribution transformer is used as
an alternative way to detect energy theft, resulting from bare
conductors lying on the ground surface. Furthermore, this
work proposes to mitigate the risk of revenue losses, quality
of supply, and risk to human life by virtue of distribution
point node isolation. The findings presented in this work show
that the philosophy of the proposed alternative technique can
possibly be applied as a detection mechanism and mitigating
strategy for NTL associated to electricity theft by ground-lying
bare conductors.
II. ENERGY THEFT IMPACT IN SOUTH AFRICA
A. The South African Environment
The South African population recorded in 2017 is approx-
imately 56 million people [11]. The country is divided into
nine provinces of which Gauteng Province, the smallest of
the nine, contributes the largest portion of GDP to the South
African economy [12]. With the current unemployment figures
of approximately 27 % [13], economic hardships are real and
do disturb the socio-economic conditions of the population.
With such economic pressures, populations migrate between
provinces in a hope to address or find solution to their socio-
economic needs. This migration leads to high densities of
population not being able to afford access to basic services
such as electricity, water and sanitation. Since Government
cannot always provide these services at insignificantly cheaper
rates, this leads to communities taking matters into their
own hands by establishing informal housing environments and
connecting to existing or nearby power-supply grids without
authorisation and/or necessary knowledge of utility companies.
This creates volatile and unsafe environments.
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B. Informal settlements and illegal connections
Informal settlements in South Africa are defined as housing
structures built out of rudimentary materials, which have not
been approved by the local authority planning department [14].
Furthermore, these structures are built on land that has not
been proclaimed nor surveyed for human settlement, and they
are then considered as illegal households, adding to the fact
that basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation
are not adequate. There are currently more than 100 recorded
informal settlements in Gauteng alone and further statistics
highlight that this province is home to approximately 25 %
of the country population [15]. The economic attractiveness
of Gauteng creates population densities where no electrical
infrastructure is provided, and this results in high densities
where illegal connections are likely to occur.
C. Methods of illegal connections
Illegal connections are defined as electricity theft when
connections are made from the power source to where it is
needed [16]. In South Africa, these illicit actions are achieved
by connecting directly to nearby lighting infrastructure, and,
more importantly, to the distribution power transformer via
a ground surface conductor, which is pertinent to this paper.
One of the methods deployed and which is investigated in
this paper, is the tapping of power from the low voltage (LV)
backbone networks via ground surface conductors supplying
the dwellings. Although it is reported that NTL in South Africa
are mostly related to energy theft occurring in the business
sector (54%) and less so in the residential sector (46%) [6],
these illegal connections mostly occur in informal settlements
(within the residential sector), where safety to the communities
is of primary concern.
D. Impact of illegal connections in the South African context
The impact of illegal connections in South Africa can be
defined as a collective of various elements: Social; Economic;
Engineering; Health and Safety. The social and economic
impact have already been discussed. What is of concern is
the engineering and safety impact illegal connections repre-
sent. The engineering impact is illustrated in Fig. 1 which
highlights the challenges that technical staff are faced with
on a daily basis. Furthermore, these illegal connections cause
major damage to network equipment and affect the quality of
supply for compliant electricity users [6], [17], [18]. Currently
in South Africa, there is no adequate detection nor protection
applied to the distribution transformer LV terminals to detect
these ZSC incidents, and the reliance of protection operation
and node isolation is dependent on the LV protection (i.e. fuses
or circuit breakers) and in some cases the fault isolation is
referred to the medium voltage (MV) fuse protection through
the transformation ratio. The problem with this philosophy
is related to the magnitude of the expected ZSC, which is
small compared to the general load conditions (on which fuse
ratings are usually based) and the general overcurrent and earth
fault expected levels. Therefore, ZSC on the LV will not be
detected by these protection devices. Danger to human life
is clearly indicated in Fig. 2 [19], where live wires lying on
the ground surface amidst the community as they go about
their daily chores. In this illustration, the illegally-connected
wires are lying among the community while they fill containers
with water. This figure represents the awareness that should
be considered in terms of providing a safe and secure supply
from power utilities. What is more concerning about this figure
though, is that this scenario is depicted as an accepted way
of living − as it seems there is no regard for the dangers
involved.
III. OVERVIEW OF ELECTRICITY THEFT DETECTION
TECHNIQUES
NTL detection techniques, such as suggested in the litera-
ture, show a multitude of possibilities, and as a consequence
highlight the plausibility of energy theft mitigation. What
is prevalent in the literature is that NTL are very difficult
to detect using administrative means. The rationale is based
on the calculations and verification of collected data. As an
added consequence, the use of data mining with incorrect data
samples integrated into measuring devices can be a futile and
costly exercise [20], [21]. Various solutions to the associated
problems have been proposed. All adopted strategies are
geared towards the consumer point of supply (PoS), with a
primary focus on revenue improvement. This situation presents
real challenges because of life hazards occurring in commu-
nities where illegal connections are common. Furthermore,
under the current strategies employed, illegal connections are
only mitigated when they have been physically removed.
Communities are highly dependent on power theft, and this
creates volatile and unsafe working conditions for engineering
teams tasked with dealing with the problem of investigation
and removals. The application of smart meter technologies is at
the forefront of worldwide deployment, South Africa included,
and is considered to be the generic mitigating solution to the
problem of NTL [22], [23]. The benefit of deploying this
technology greatly improves revenue management if admin-
istered well and is typically deployed at the consumer’s PoS
where energy theft and billing unit tampering are detected.
The application therefore contributes significantly to NTL
revenue management. The smart meter strategy specifically
addresses NTL as a mechanism to detect energy loss variances
between the network supply and the PoS through energy
balancing [20]− [22]. This application measures the energy
variance and can therefore detect illegal connections in theory.
However, it cannot detect ground surface conductors directly
− only indirectly. Indirect detection would be a function
of variance management in the supply and demand, and the
dispatch of engineering teams to investigate and remove such
illegal connections. The limitation this strategy presents, is
in detecting how these energy variances occur − i.e. illegal
connections by ground surface conductors or by aerial tapping
of the LV network. Boosting the network supply voltage is
another suggested application [23]. This strategy suggests an
increase of the network supply voltage to 350V (phase to
neutral), and then its reduction to 230V (phase to neutral) at
each PoS with dedicated transformers. The benefit associated
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Fig. 1: Left: Illegal connection. Right: Live wires illegally connected to supply and lying on the ground [16], [19]
Fig. 2: Illegal connections on the ground near water
with this strategy are attributed to a practical solution around
the problem, as the phase-neutral voltages are considerably
higher and may cause damage to appliances in the event
of illegal tapping from the overhead line. Thus, this is a
deterrent. The limitation with this strategy is, however, the
cost associated with upgrading current infrastructure to comply
with this proposed application and the dangers to communi-
ties associated with higher supply voltages. A time domain
reflection (TDR) philosophy is another commonly proposed
option. This application is reliant on impedance variance
arising from a return frequency measured in accordance with
the expected network parameter impedance. Based on these
set parameters this technique can detect normal condition or
possible theft of energy [24]. The benefit of this philosophy
consists of its proven application as a detection technique in
cable-fault management, and may therefore be applied in this
particular instance. However, its limitation is that although
it might detect such impedance variance because of illegal
connections, it allows for high cost of deployment and relies
on engineering teams to investigate and further remove such
connections. Therefore, despite decades of research work in
the detection and mitigation of electricity theft and NTL, no
general solution has been adopted from the source end which
clearly indicates the complexity of this problem. This also
justifies further research opportunities in this topic in a bid
to particularly address NTL by illegal connections as a result
of bare conductors on the ground surface such as commonly
encountered in South Africa.
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
A. Topology of South African low voltage networks
The typical network topology deployed within the South
African environment is highlighted in Fig.3. The typical
network arrangement for LV distribution of energy in elec-
trification networks is terminated to the LV grid through a
Delta-star vector group distribution transformer, which supply
the remaining part of the LV grid with insulated bundled
concentric cable to the household receiving end. This type
of electrification infrastructure allows for the most attractive
cost of deployment and is considered to be the benchmark for
all electrification projects. The standard LV applied network
voltages in this arrangement are typically 400 V phase-to
phase and 230 V in the single-phase arrangements.
B. LV earthing arrangement
LV earthing in these networks is adopted by the IEC 60364
and SANS 10292 where the TN-C and TN-C-S configurations
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Fig. 3: Low-Voltage supply systems used in South African
networks [19].
are used [25], [26]. This method of earthing allows for a
PEN conductor (protective earth and neutral) to be used
to ensure that the appropriate earthing is achieved in the
household, and further allows for ZSC to return to the star-
point of the distribution transformer in the event of an earth
fault condition occurring. This is done to avoid the impact
of the soil resistivity on the associated fault impedance and
fault currents required for invoking protection operation. This
earthing arrangement is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: South African Earthing arrangement [25].
C. Zero-sequence current theory
Zero-Sequence Current (ZSC) is established once an earth
fault condition occurs within a three-phase supply network.
This type of fault is then considered to be an imbalance
condition. The typical fault impedance arrangement is indi-
cated in Fig. 5. In order for calculations to be performed, the
impedance values under unbalanced fault conditions need to be
determined. The Fortesque method is often applied to convert
these asymmetrical conditions into symmetrical components












io : zero sequence current
i1 : positive sequence current
i2 : negative sequence current
ia : current in phase a
Fig. 5: Zero-sequence impedance components for a phase to
ground (P-G) fault.
ib : current in phase b
ic : current in phase c
a : 1∠120o
The various sequence current components may be determined
by linearisation of the matrix equation provided in (1). For
an earth fault on phase a, the resulting fault current has
proven to be three times the zero sequence current component
(ia = 3× i0). Furthermore, under earth fault condition
such as outlined in Fig. 5, the total impedance consists
of the summation of positive, negative and zero sequence
impedances of all the network components including the
fault current impedance path (3Zf ). This can be expressed as
follows:
ia = 3× i0 =
3× Va
Z1 + Z2 + Z0 + 3Zf
(2)
Where:
Va : voltage in phase a
Z1 : positive sequence impedance
Z2 : negative sequence impedance
Z0 : zero sequence impedance
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D. Measurement of zero-sequence current in the proposed
mitigating strategy
The intended outcome of this paper is to demonstrate the
use of ZSC as a possible detecting and mitigating technique
for electricity theft detection. Fig. 6 (below) highlights the
proposed measuring method for the detection of ZSC during
ground surface conductor-based illegal connections supplied
from the distribution source transformer [?]. The neutral ter-
minal (n) and earth conductor are electrically bonded together
at the supply point. Furthermore, this earth conductor is then
placed into the soil by an earthing arrangement that would
yield the least resistance possible − typically less than 10 Ω.
This arrangement now provides for the electrical reference
point of the system, as well as the path for ZSC to return
to the source transformer.
Fig. 6: ZSC measurement in the star point.
V. METHODOLOGY
A. Field soil resistivity tests
Soil resistivity tests were conducted at the outskirts of
informal housing settlements found in Gauteng. A presuppose
of these tests was multiple bare conductors on the ground
surface (illegal connections) found within these environments.
The test setup requirements to accomplish this task is
illustrated in Fig. 7. The method employed was the Wenner
test method, which allowed for an average of five recorded
results to be tested over an average area of approximately
80 m2. The test involved applies the Chauvin Arnoux model
4630 measuring instrument to four electrodes driven into
the ground at specific distances apart (a) and at a specific
depth (d). The depths of the electrodes were calculated as
a function of the electrode distance separation. A current
source was then applied at the two outer earth electrodes
and a voltage was measured over the two inner electrodes.
Temperature readings of the soil were also recorded as part
of the testing sequence. The distribution of currents typically
Fig. 7: Soil resistivity Wenner test method [28].
Fig. 8: Distribution of currents in the soil under test [28].
found within this test arrangement is shown in Fig. 8. The
soil resistivity (ρ) is then recorded from the instrument, and
using the following equation:
ρmeas. = 2πa ·
4V
I
= 2πa ·R (3)
Where:
ρmeas. : Soil resistivity





The Digsilent software package version 15 was used to
perform simulations of a simplified network. The network
consisted of an external grid supplying an overhead conductor
through an 11/0.415 kV Dyn transformer. Several types of
ground faults were simulated over a range of resistance value
assigned to the fault current path. The results obtained were
compared to values obtained during laboratory experiments.
The digsilent simulation arrangement is indicated in Fig.9.
C. Laboratory experiment
A schematic of the test setup is shown in Fig. 10, while the
simulator, such as physically used in a laboratory environment
for validation testing [29], is indicated in Fig. 11. The test
setup involved used a bespoke Dyn11 transformer with a
ratio of 1 (415:415) and impedance of 4%. This arrangement
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Fig. 9: Digsilent simulation arrangement
Fig. 10: Schematic of laboratory test set-up
allowed for a connection to be made to the external 3-phase,
4 wire local authority supply grid. The transformation ratio
was specifically chosen, as this allowed for the simulator
to represent actual LV voltages, and allowed for the test
simulator to be isolated from the main grid. Two 100 Ω 15
W variable resistors were connected in parallel to achieve the
desired calculated ohmic values required for the test. These
ohmic values represented the actual values of soil resistances
deduced from field tests. The resistances were then calibrated
to the specific required values, and then connected between
the transformer star point and the various phase configurations
required for validation of all test. All currents were measured
using current transformers (CT) appropriately placed within
the test setup and the associated voltages were recorded with
handheld voltmeters.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The following results were recorded for the various tests
conducted. These results included the soil resistivity field tests
as given in Table 1, the ZSC Digsilent simulation results as
provided in Table 2, the laboratory measurement results of
ZSC such as provided in Table 3, as well as the ZSC compar-
ative curve given in Fig. 12. From the results obtained, the
following findings are presented: The ZSC versus resistance
graph such as presented in Fig. 12 demonstrate the validation
of the findings obtained in the laboratory experiment relative
Fig. 11: Laboratory experimental simulator
to the Digsilent simulation. This validation was limited to
the simulators testing abilities, as resistances lower that 15Ω
would yield currents larger than what the test simulation could
produce. This limitation was accepted, as the interest in the
test was to understand current values in the larger resistance
ranges. It could be observed that resistance values larger than
Fig. 12: Validation of test and simulated results
30 Ω will lead to currents lower than the anticipated ZSC
measurement of 5A. This 5A limit is identified as the conven-
tional lower limit for ZSC mitigation of illegal connections
by ground surface conductors. The most significant factor
in the total ZSC fault impedance equation is the variable
characteristic of soil resistivity condition. The test conditions
done with various types of soil conditions (i.e. moist to dry),
find that in soil conditions such as moist, the resistivity values
yield better results (compared to dry soil conditions). This
observation is important, as these tests were conducted during
the South African winter season (June-July), and in South
Africa most of the soil conditions are attributed to clay-sand,
which has a better water retention property. However, soil
resistivity is directly affected by temperature such as discussed
in [30], [31]. In colder environments, water is drawn from the
surface of the soil, so increasing the resistance, while as the
soil heats up due to exposed radiation, water is drawn to the
surface, thus reducing the soil resistance once again. However,
this phenomenon is directly proportional to the rain season of
the area, and should this area be exposed to prolonged drought,
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TABLE I: Soil Resistivity Results in various areas of the Gauteng Province
Area Soil Condition Temperature Soil Resistivity (ρ) Resistance (R)
Alberton moist 21.8 45.34 2.41
Brakpan marsh 28.1 14.52 0.77
Mapleton moist 30.6 88.32 4.68
Sebokeng dry 33.6 215.2 11.42
Kagiso dry 29.2 351.8 18.66
Etwatwa dry 25.5 187.2 9.93
Tsakane moist 20.9 26.88 1.43
Ratanda moist 21.2 19.52 1.04
Meyerton dry 23.8 68.54 3.64
Zuurbekom dry 19.1 765.54 40.61
- - oC Ω.m Ω
TABLE II: ZSC Digsilent Simulation Results
R Fault Type ZSC ZSC From Eq.2
5 P-G 48 47.37
10 P-G 24 23.84
15 P-G 16 15.93
20 P-G 12 11.96
25 P-G 10 9.57
30 P-G 8 7.98
40 P-G 6 5.99
50 P-G 5 4.79
5 P-P-G 16 15.98
30 P-P-G 3 2.67
50 P-P-G 2 1.6
5 3P-G 48 44.42
30 3P-G 8 7.89
50 3P-G 5 4.79
Ω - A A
TABLE III: ZSC Experimental (Simulator) Results
R Fault Type ZSC
5 P-G could not be measured







5 P-P-G could not be measured
30 P-P-G 2.15
50 P-P-G 1.16




water evaporation would eventually take place and increase
soil resistance once again.
VII. CONCLUSION
Illegal connections in South Africa are a pervasive problem
perpetuated by socio-economic conditions, lack of political
will, and unemployment. Although much has been done to
mitigate these issues, government cannot sustain the demand
for housing and the associated basic services required by
the communities, due to slow infrastructure development
progress and population migration patterns. This paper sets
out to propose an alternative strategy using ZSC to detect
and mitigate illegal connections specifically because of
bare conductors lying on the ground surface scenario. For
decades the issue of NTL and electricity theft has been the
focus of continued research. Most of the focus has been
on dealing with the point of supply at the customer end,
rather than also considering the consequential safety effect
the illicit acts present. With the advent and deployment of
smart metering technology systems, which primarily focus
on revenue improvement, energy balancing can be applied to
detect NTL due to perceived electricity theft. This philosophy
however has limitations, as it depends on accurate network
data (data mining) and demand load management patterns,
and furthermore cannot detect and isolate the primary supply
node, should these illegal connections occur. The only way
to deal with these illegal connections, using this approach,
is to dispatch engineering teams to investigate and remove
the illegal connections which is problematic as the acts of
removal initiate volatile environments for the teams to operate
under, and this therefore further escalates the safety risk. The
alternative proposed ZSC philosophy does not consider load
demand patterns in the decision-making algorithm and can
therefore be applied as a detection and mitigation strategy.
The presence of ZSC due to ground surface conductors can
be measured in the star-point of the primary supply node.
With the proposed IED development installed, dispatch alarms
can isolate the affected node automatically, so mitigating the
safety aspect and NTL losses. The South African OHS Act
85 of 1993 requires that electrical supply utilities ensure safe
network supply at all times, and as is the case with illegal
connections this becomes very challenging if not impossible
to deal with, and therefore engineering solutions need to be
found to mitigate this through a collective approach, supported
by government and supply authorities.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
Future research is currently being undertaken to further
understand the effect ZSC has in the practical environment.
This work will concentrate on establishing the true ZSC
component fundamentals based on field data compilations
measured over time, and therefore a design and implemen-
tation of an algorithm integrated into a bespoke measuring
device (IED) which will intend to alarm or possibly isolate
the effected supply node as a result of illegal connections by
ground surface bare conductors.
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